Well, there is quite a stir over David Brook's "neural Buddhism" (neocons haven't been driven to drink, they've taken to examining their neuro-capacity for prayer...):
First, the self is not a fixed entity but a dynamic process of relationships. Second, underneath the patina of different religions, people around the world have common moral intuitions. Third, people are equipped to experience the sacred, to have moments of elevated experience when they transcend boundaries and overflow with love. Fourth, God can best be conceived as the nature one experiences at those moments, the unknowable total of all there is.
My first pass on this is that it is all just rubbish.
First, neuroscience has no more insight into "the self" than do religions - both are constructs. The notion that there is a dynamic process at work doesn't seem a feature to distinguish two schools of thought - both would largely agree, with exceptions. It's not clear that a range of brain propensities or even capacities informs a great deal about religion. Does it? How?
The second is very unconvincing. Why would we focus on the confirming evidence and not the dis-confirming evidence? Even today, the world over, people feel they have sufficiently distinct 'moral intuitions' by which to go to war, even.
The third is stylized. Who has seen the face of God? Put another way, "... insisting on the exclusive validity of one kind of interaction with God seems a little, er, defensive, even narrow".
Fourth, sounds like ... Spinoza? This conception seems to lack ... depth (or be somehow far more complex than the author lets on, if it really is Spinoza). I suspect, on inspection, we'd find more aspects to God than captured in this image of ... experiential transcendentalism? If so, that creates a problem in linking deterministically a "mental state" with "experiencing God".
