Exhibiting keen editorial selection, AS singles out three pieces on Iraq.
For readers, I'll summarize:
DUST GETS IN YOUR EYES
Inside the Surge
The American military finds new allies, but at what cost?
by Jon Lee Anderson
If you opined a long time ago that just Anbar was quasi-mafioso, this story lets you know that it goes beyond that to include the Baghdad neighborhood of Ghazaliya and that - surprise - protective militias in other areas have turned into 'extortion' rackets, fairly easily.
If the hope was some sort of civil society, think again. Equilibrium here is described as a story of vendetta.
At the end of a cycle of killing (or still some way along in the middle of it?), "Victory" here is the absence of people killing each other and finding a few people at the local level who seem to have the take-charge abilities required to keep calm.
Altogether, however, one has a sense of "arc" to the Iraqi developments.
From the 'insurgency' perspective, the first years were about bringing the U.S. (Bush?) to its knees, then the violence took on its own life under an 'alliance' with al-qa'ida using a sectarian banner.
After a lot of killing and refugees, as well as a move to change the security posture to make backsliding hard, the way forward seems both easier and just as out of reach as at the start.
The absence of a unbalanced will to tear things apart but to go along in grief over the situation is ... a turning point, possibly the hollow, unremarked "victory" point, in Lee's analysis. (It's true that some turning points in counterinsurgency are almost impossible to know, except sometimes quite some time afterwards).
If the hope was some sort of civil society, think again. Equilibrium here is described as a story of vendetta.
At the end of a cycle of killing (or still some way along in the middle of it?), "Victory" here is the absence of people killing each other and finding a few people at the local level who seem to have the take-charge abilities required to keep calm.
Ghazaliya, [home of the "Mother of all Battles Mosque" and the neighborhood that housed Saddam during Gulf-I], is a microcosm of what Iraq faces as a whole. The Iraq Study Group said national reconciliation was essential, and I agree. Until Iraqis work out the Sunni-Shia sectarian issues, they’re going to have a very tough time making meaningful or lasting progress
Altogether, however, one has a sense of "arc" to the Iraqi developments.
From the 'insurgency' perspective, the first years were about bringing the U.S. (Bush?) to its knees, then the violence took on its own life under an 'alliance' with al-qa'ida using a sectarian banner.
After a lot of killing and refugees, as well as a move to change the security posture to make backsliding hard, the way forward seems both easier and just as out of reach as at the start.
The absence of a unbalanced will to tear things apart but to go along in grief over the situation is ... a turning point, possibly the hollow, unremarked "victory" point, in Lee's analysis. (It's true that some turning points in counterinsurgency are almost impossible to know, except sometimes quite some time afterwards).
THE WAY FORWARD
Katulis: Looking at the Broader Perspective
by Mark Lynch (a.k.a. Abu Aardvark), Mid East Scholar at GWU
This is a broad ranging discussion about the prospects for stabilization.
Not surprisingly, how to consolidate the 'security gains' politically is the main point of contention (as noted on this blog months ago). Neither a bottom-up or a top-down approach seem sufficient of convincing. This is the ultimate discussion about tactics.
Iraq is not a sovereign nation, but the leadership pretending it is have gotten out of the Green Zone a little be lately.
Few inside Iraq are calling for or supporting Provincial elections, from what I read here, something I thought was strategically important. *gulp* Turns out the existing power structures don't want them and the central government has other priorities, including the Sunni Block that exited the government in October.
We'll see what the U.N. comes up with, but this suggests that the idea of "National Reconciliation" as we westerners might think of it if being supplanted by other notions of what is doable.
Staying to police the power-block struggle for power might be a way to maintain U.S. influence, even favorable influence, as some have suggested. [However, there is ample experience that this does not work over the long haul. Two examples are from Ireland (see General Jone's report/comments) and possible the British experience in Palestine. The problem is that the two sides (or more) first turn on you, then on each other... This suggests that there has to be rapid forward movement in order to gather no moss.]
Not surprisingly, how to consolidate the 'security gains' politically is the main point of contention (as noted on this blog months ago). Neither a bottom-up or a top-down approach seem sufficient of convincing. This is the ultimate discussion about tactics.
Iraq is not a sovereign nation, but the leadership pretending it is have gotten out of the Green Zone a little be lately.
Few inside Iraq are calling for or supporting Provincial elections, from what I read here, something I thought was strategically important. *gulp* Turns out the existing power structures don't want them and the central government has other priorities, including the Sunni Block that exited the government in October.
We'll see what the U.N. comes up with, but this suggests that the idea of "National Reconciliation" as we westerners might think of it if being supplanted by other notions of what is doable.
Staying to police the power-block struggle for power might be a way to maintain U.S. influence, even favorable influence, as some have suggested. [However, there is ample experience that this does not work over the long haul. Two examples are from Ireland (see General Jone's report/comments) and possible the British experience in Palestine. The problem is that the two sides (or more) first turn on you, then on each other... This suggests that there has to be rapid forward movement in order to gather no moss.]
NO TIME, WILL, OR MONEY LEFT, BUT LOTS OF TIME, MONEY, WILL NEEDED
Iraqis Wasting An Opportunity, U.S. Officers Say
With Attacks Ebbing, Government Is Urged to Reach Out to Opponents
By Thomas E. Ricks
Washington Post Staff Writer
Thursday, November 15, 2007; Page A01
Now that people aren't dying en masse, the urgency is ... not showing up in "results".
70,000 neighborhood volunteers participating in bottom-up security. Prior article notes that only 1,600 have so far come under the command-and-control structures of the government(s), a mere drop in the bucket of what is needed.
70,000 neighborhood volunteers participating in bottom-up security. Prior article notes that only 1,600 have so far come under the command-and-control structures of the government(s), a mere drop in the bucket of what is needed.
So, how to force political change in Iraq without destabilizing the country further? "I pity the guy who has to reconcile that tension," said Lt. Col. Douglas Ollivant, the chief of planning for U.S. military operations in Baghdad, whose tour of duty ends next month.
