Devastating put-up of the catch-22 equation, the crux of which Petreaus himself spoke to in his confirmation hearing (as I recall) :
Sept. 24, 2007 issue - There is a central contradiction in almost every defense of the surge that I have heard or read. More troops and a new counterinsurgency strategy were meant to improve security so that Iraqi politicians could then reconcile. But the most important evidence cited to prove the surge's success shows that the process works the opposite way. - Fareed Zakaria
FZ wants to "go long". Right or wrong, no one wants to hear it.
Not that it matters. I strongly suspect that 30K troops ad infinitum is what has been on the 'secret plans' for a long time. Too many tea leaves pointing in that direction.
SHOESTRING FORCE LEVELS
On why we lost the effort to stabilize Iraq, FZ just goes for it, this time without even brushing aside the hackneyed concerns about the impact of force presence on a civilian population wary of 'occupation':
The surge has proved that more troops can produce enhanced security—are you listening, Mr. Rumsfeld?.
Blissfully unaware of the scathing indictment (pdf) she has just written of the USA's whole conceptualization of the stabilization effort in Iraq, Kimberly Kagan forges ahead nonetheless, but offers this concession in bold:
Before the surge, American forces in Iraq were generally stretched too thin to interdict the main routes of supply the Iranians used to support their proxies.
May those responsible ...
footnote: Fareed and so many commentators are forgetting their history. The surge was put forward to stop a spiral in Baghdad, not "Iraq". I remember because, at the time, the commentary here was, 'yes, more troops would reduce violence, but focusing on the Battle-for-Baghdad was just like playing whack-a-mole, but with bigger mole-holes.'
Of course, long way into the surge, that criticism has been shown to be sound, as the army spreads out to 'the Baghdad belts', the Northern Provinces, and stations a set of Georgian troops to interdict the proverbial road to Qom, etc.
