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Thursday, July 12, 2007

July 12, 10:30 a.m., Republican Bush Gives His Performance of "Swimming to Cambodia"



When Joe Sudbay and AS are on the same page, I don't need to but in. I couldn't bear to watch Bush's own Swimming to Cambodia monologue, anyway.

NO GOOD CHOICES LEFT IN IRAQ

As Jessica Matthews said a long time ago, there are no good choices left in Iraq. We either face-up to the quagmire costs / exit costs now or we don't. It's really that simple.

What's more, our fate there is not in our own hands, clearly, notwithstanding al-aqeada in Iraq.

OUR LEADERSHIP IS JUST AS MUCH A PROBLEM AS IS THE IRAQIS

December 20, 2006, King George "The Decider", announces his new strategy from the White Palace.
The corollary to that is that this President doesn't appear to have the imagination required on how to handle the politics of a situation just like that, and it seems bizarre to expect the military or a disempowered and distrusted State Department to do it without deeply involved leadership from the oval.

Rather, the Republican President appears to want to handle most of it Texas style - you look 'em in the eye and declare whether they are a 'man of peace' or the 'man for the job' or whatever. Clearly, this is sophomoric in a situation as complex as managing a general Shia 'leadership' who historically have not been the top officials and bureaucrats inside Iraq, who basically have the political experience and institutional know-how, many of them, of, say, your local selectman.


We still have no national consensus on these; and we, therefore, cannot hold a national strategic review, without getting desperately sidetracked.
OUR STRATEGIC REVIEW NONSENSE

Our strategic review process has reverted, for a second, third, or fourth time, to opinions about whether we should have gone into Iraq in the first place and whether we are safer now or not. There are all kinds of sub-groupings, about the conduct in the run-up to the war, who is to responsible for the abject failure of stabilization efforts, torture sessions directly sponsored by the CIC, secret prisons, confronting al-qaeda or providing them a platform, permanent bases, equipment for the troops, medical care for the vets - you name it, the list is long, long, long.

We still have no national consensus on these; and we, therefore, cannot hold a national strategic review, without getting desperately sidetracked. The consensus that does exist is fairly shallow, centered on a few items of deep discord, it seems, although it is beyond this keyboard to scientifically dissect the mood from rational opinions of the entire populace.

What we have, instead, are strategies that we think will make progress toward goals and, so far, an unlimited-time, Republican rubberstamp and debt-spending, Republican commitment to keep trying things to see if progress can be made.
PAY THE PIPER TIME POSTPONED UNTIL THE END OF BUSH-CHENEY TENURE?

The bottom line is whether there is anything that can be realistically achieved in Iraq, in a given period of time, loosely fixed, but certainly finite. The truth is that no one knows the answer to that question. (Although we can state lofty goals, all the variables to achieve them are not in our hands, making what is realistic highly uncertain, however alluring lofty goals appear, like a government cohesive enough to 'defend itself').

What we have, instead, are strategies that we think will make progress toward goals and, so far, an unlimited time Republican rubberstamp and debt-spending Republican commitment to keep trying things to see if progress can be made.


Bush-Cheney, by ALL indications, are determined that the very costly "trial period" will not end on their watch. All they need is to get past one or two more appropriations rounds, in their minds, to have their wish come true. (One can argue as the facts on the ground develop, whether that is a craven political calculation or a considered view...)

What's worse, though, is that it is clear that the GOP machine has been in overdrive emphasizing the magnitude of the exit costs (a.k.a. the quagmire costs). Their argument spills over from we must not face these costs (an opinion) to we cannot face these costs (a fact or an indictment of someone's will to win, or their patriotism).

What's wrong with their propaganda is that quagmire situations, such as this one that their early dereliction created, do not allow for a costless retreat, by definition. Military historians will tell you to pay the price and to get out, rather than to stay the Moscow winter, say. Sometimes, you have to leave the battlefield, even at great cost, rather than bleed your army slowly to death. Of course, this may be an academic point, if no one comes up with a way to extend the army's tours beyond their current expiration. That's a kind of 'forced withdrawal', as it were, yes?

The action-reaction-counteraction cycle is probably 12 months, plus or minus. That's the measurement period for a 'surge', arguably.
STRATEGIC REVIEWS SHOULD COUNT

On the other hand, I believe that 'strategic reviews' should count, that we should have a sense of forward movement or retreat on our own chosen metrics which have implications for changing strategy or withholding more money into a venture that isn't proving itself worth current resources, even if there are exit costs to face up to.

Sure, the holy grail of progress is unmeasurable. Petreaus is right. Ultimately progress against insurgency is in the minds and attitudes of Iraqis. However, you cannot "surge", a short-term notion, but suggest that results should be measured over long periods of time, like nine years. The action-reaction-counteraction cycle is probably 12 months, plus or minus. That's the measurement period for a 'surge', arguably. (And of course the lead-in time counts, if you are the prime mover on the battlefield and announce a change!) Long-term measures of progress against the insurgency and toward stability, of course, are influenced by what happens before, during, and after any "surge", so they are incorporated, not some separate 'hope' or set of measures. In short, the long-run is nothing more than a series of short-runs, to purloin an economists famous phrase.

Sadly, however, in the real world, there are not endless resources. So, we have to use imperfect measures and the lattitude given for type-II error (i.e., you think you are wrong, when you are right) shrinks with the passage of time given to reach goals by changing strategies and tactics, it doesn't increase. On that score, time is against us, not with us.

You cannot keep trying things, either. Typically, you have only limited resources to 'take your best shot' with a few of your best ideas, and maybe one or two cycles to refine an approach, based on 'lessons learned'. After that, time is up. What's more, from a decision-theoretic point of view, if you keep dating, waiting for a perfect match to show up, you can end up with an infinite wait time (I haven't done queuing theory in an age, but I think that can be shown to be true). Both practically and theoretically, one has to make choices when to stop trying.

WHEN THE GOP START TO PAY FOR THE WAR, TO SACRIFICE

If the GOP went to their 'have-more' base and started to pay for the war-costs to date (you know, with meaningful wealth moves from private to public, not some silly gas tax), one could make the case that they are willing to finance their jockey, Bush, to keep giving it the 'ol college try.

Until then, the clock is ticking and very near to midnight, I think, barring signs of political will and alignment inside Iraq.

What's more, to the extent that "victory" is intentionally denied to Bush-Cheney as the 'sinners of a 1000 years' for having invaded 'Muslim lands', the potential that our own involvement is our undoing is a possibility, a path-dependent outcome with a probability that is beyond measuring, most likely (although I suppose we could count up those with well-known and rehearsed Islamic-rejectionist attitudes as a percentage of the whole and use that as a proxy ... if so, it would be quite high, certainly high enough to cause hesitation before any further escalations).