Quality of earnings:
Consider Lehman Brothers and other firms that increased their profits quite dramatically until last year through investments in mortgage-backed and similar assets. Their profit growth was dramatic, as was their stock price performance, almost doubling from $44 at the start of 2005 to around $80 in June of 2007. However, if one considers the growth in the amount of assets on their balance sheet, the trend in profitability is much more modest.
Second, one ignores the quality of assets on the balance sheet. If one had paid attention to the rising profits from these risky investments with one eye on the balance sheet, one might have had a better appreciation for the nature of the risk involved. Of course, regulators made this worse by allowing firms to place many of their assets (such as Variable Interest Entities (VIEs), which are at the heart of the subprime mess) off the balance sheets. When people ignore what's on the balance sheet, what are the odds that they're reading the footnotes to see what's left off it?
Second, one ignores the quality of assets on the balance sheet. If one had paid attention to the rising profits from these risky investments with one eye on the balance sheet, one might have had a better appreciation for the nature of the risk involved. Of course, regulators made this worse by allowing firms to place many of their assets (such as Variable Interest Entities (VIEs), which are at the heart of the subprime mess) off the balance sheets. When people ignore what's on the balance sheet, what are the odds that they're reading the footnotes to see what's left off it?
Balance sheet analysis is so ... messy and difficult. It really is.
