WOULDN'T A PROPER INVESTIGATION BE SO MUCH BETTER?
We all have to be careful not to seize on nuggets that may be part of a rightwing dis-information campaign that could later dent the credibility of an inquiry, but the Right blogosphere has the torture news of the day.
The office of the Vice President - whoever that turns out to be - is implicated in a communications chain in which "suggestions" of torture were passed down the chain, during the early interrogation of a captured, high-level Iraqi intelligence officer, Muhammed Khudayr al-Dulaymi in April, 2003.
Robert Windrem, writing exclusively at the DailyBeast:
*Two U.S. intelligence officers confirm that Vice President Cheney’s office suggested waterboarding an Iraqi prisoner, a former intelligence official for Saddam Hussein, who was suspected to have knowledge of a Saddam-al Qaeda connection.
*The former chief of the Iraq Survey Group, Charles Duelfer, in charge of interrogations, tells The Daily Beast that he considered the request reprehensible.
*The former chief of the Iraq Survey Group, Charles Duelfer, in charge of interrogations, tells The Daily Beast that he considered the request reprehensible.
Just for the record, I'm still waiting for someone to publish the cost to the taxpayers of the Iraqi Survey Group's big adventure (Joe Biden, can you please help?). More below the fold - this is not small potatoes!
Q: Now, one of the things that was revealed today, if the article is correct, is that the administration is seeking an additional $600 million to fund the Iraq survey group, to keep it going and to provide resources for its continued efforts. Is that accurate?
MR. McCLELLAN: There -- as with normal, or other budget appropriations, there are classified sections within those appropriations. This is a wartime supplemental. It does have a classified section, and it would not be appropriate for me to discuss those classified sections.
[...]
Q: Follow-up to Jim's question. Why is the amount of money the administration is seeking for the Iraq survey group classified? What's the rationale for that?
MR. McCLELLAN: There are classified sections in it. One, I can't get into the classified section of budget appropriations. This is a wartime supplemental, and so I can't -- it's not appropriate for me to discuss it -- the classified section further. You're asking me to get into confirming or denying certain parts of that matter.
But the Iraq survey group, as I've noted over here, continues to do its job. Keep in mind that Saddam Hussein had a sophisticated concealment strategy that was well-known, trying to deceive the international community, trying to conceal -- and they were caught by the weapons inspectors in the past for what they were concealing. So the Iraq survey group has a massive amount of documents, miles of documents to go through to uncover the full truth of his weapons of mass destruction programs. And that work continues. And it's important work.
Q: I'm not asking you to discuss what's in that classified section. I'm asking you what is -- as a matter of policy, why does that amount of money have --
MR. McCLELLAN: That would be asking me to talk about classified sections of the report.
Q: No, just the policy rationale for keeping this -- why is that -- why does that have to be secret?
MR. McCLELLAN: That's making assumptions about what's in the classified section of the report. It's a classified section that you're asking me to discuss
MR. McCLELLAN: There -- as with normal, or other budget appropriations, there are classified sections within those appropriations. This is a wartime supplemental. It does have a classified section, and it would not be appropriate for me to discuss those classified sections.
[...]
Q: Follow-up to Jim's question. Why is the amount of money the administration is seeking for the Iraq survey group classified? What's the rationale for that?
MR. McCLELLAN: There are classified sections in it. One, I can't get into the classified section of budget appropriations. This is a wartime supplemental, and so I can't -- it's not appropriate for me to discuss it -- the classified section further. You're asking me to get into confirming or denying certain parts of that matter.
But the Iraq survey group, as I've noted over here, continues to do its job. Keep in mind that Saddam Hussein had a sophisticated concealment strategy that was well-known, trying to deceive the international community, trying to conceal -- and they were caught by the weapons inspectors in the past for what they were concealing. So the Iraq survey group has a massive amount of documents, miles of documents to go through to uncover the full truth of his weapons of mass destruction programs. And that work continues. And it's important work.
Q: I'm not asking you to discuss what's in that classified section. I'm asking you what is -- as a matter of policy, why does that amount of money have --
MR. McCLELLAN: That would be asking me to talk about classified sections of the report.
Q: No, just the policy rationale for keeping this -- why is that -- why does that have to be secret?
MR. McCLELLAN: That's making assumptions about what's in the classified section of the report. It's a classified section that you're asking me to discuss
Oh, no, you are not done. There is more (can you believe it?).
