Folks are still groping around with this "new" strategy for Iraq. People cannot even agree whether more force is relevant; but yet, it is possible still to quibble over how many is relevant, if it is. That's our reduced hypothetical reality these days (sigh).
Here's another 2-cents. 80,000 might have been pared back on practical grounds; because, after a certain level (I forget, but I think it is in the 20-30K range), there are all sorts of support and command functions that also need to be built out. That takes time and money. The 21,5K plus-up put troop levels within the prior maximum range (?circa 160K at peak), and therefore within grasp, in a short time, albeit with a price on soldier moral due to mandatory tour extensions.
We might fault Rumsfeld's planners, if some figure like 80K is more justifiable than 21,5K. If that prior group never, ever imagined a 'surge' or escalation, that might leave us flat-footed, now, when it seems like it might be an idea with some short-term merit.
Meanwhile, one of the keys to assessing the policy is whether one fully believes the reasons for the prior efforts failing, namely that the "hold" part of the equation was wanting (the political interference probably can be taken as a given). My sixth-sense says that there are unspoken truths here. All the same, a re-ordered effort is worth a try.
sullylink
