I suspect the overall situation is worse than Andrew lets on.
If you look though this bit on how terrorists use the internet, you gain an appreciation of how much "free" information isn't being aptly culled.
Other items of note (process/institutional-design related):
- It's hard for Arabic (and other language) speakers to get clearances, even second generation - their 'backgrounds' cannot be verified.
- People with knowledge of the regions can often easily tell from dialect and accent who is from where, something that no amount of book learning will create.
- We have no idea how much information that is freely available we are missing (although there are statistical exercises that could estimate that)
Other, threat-related
- The Internet provides for recruiting. Videos have gotten increasingly sophisticated.
- The notion that al-qa'ida use of the internet is primitive is possibly to ignore a gathering threat
- Virtual community provided, in some instance, directly to terrorists and sympathizers
- A large number of voyeurs on various websites
- Calls for logistical support provided by decentralized network of experts
- The idea that to openly oppose jihad is to oppose Islam is possibly deeply rooted - it's not just intimidation, it's cultural milieu, it's acceptable mores.
An US Gov't interrogator once told the author that there are "32 ways to spell Qa'daffi". "Not in Arabic", she thought to herself ...
sullylink
